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Shooting for an Economic “Miracle”: German Post-War Neoliberal 
Thought in China’s Market Reform Debate*  
Isabella M. Weber, University of Massachusetts Amherst 
Abstract  
This paper develops a comparative and connected history of the debates over transition to a market economy in 
West-Germany after World War II and in China during the first decade of reform and opening up under Deng 
Xiaoping (1978-1988). At both historical moments the political aim was to reintroduce market mechanisms into 
a dysfunctional command economy. The question what kind of price reform this required was subject to heated 
debates among economists. This paper shows how the West-German 1948 currency and price reform was 
introduced into the Chinese reform debate by German ordoliberals and neoliberals like Friedman. It traces how 
the West-German case study was mystified as “Erhard Miracle” and became a metaphor for the vision of universal 
overnight price liberalisation in China – a core element of shock therapy.  
Keywords: Neoliberalism, Socialism, China, Germany, Market transition, Price theory 
The tide of neoliberalism that swept the globe under the aegis of the Bretton Woods 
institutions from the late 1970s onward transformed planned and mixed economies 
profoundly. The quintessentially neo- liberal shock therapy of this period, however, has an 
antecedent a generation earlier: in the postwar West German price and currency reform of 
1948. Indeed, 1948 should be seen as the true origin of the shock therapy doctrine. Although 
postwar West Germany may be associated with the “social market economy,” the qualification 
“social” is commonly misunderstood as denoting an interventionist, welfare- oriented form of 
capitalism. Yet as scholars have shown, the social market economy finds its intellectual 
foundations in ordoliberalism and constitutes a precursor to the rise of neoliberalism as a 
global pol- icy paradigm at a time when most capitalist economies were organized along 
Keynesian lines.1  
In this chapter, I explore the case of China’s market reform under Deng Xiaoping and 
show that the so-called West German “economic miracle” was mobilized as an archetype to 
promote the neoliberal pol- icy of wholesale price liberalization, the sine qua non of shock 
therapy. As I argue elsewhere, China ultimately escaped shock therapy and has only partially 
assimilated itself to global neoliberalism.2 Yet the Chinese market-reform debate reveals a 
previously underappreciated  
*This paper is forthcoming as a chapter in Slobodian, Q. and D. Plehwe (2022). Market Civilizations: 
Neoliberals East and South. Princeton: Zone Books. The page numbers in this working paper are the same as the 
page numbers in the book. Please cite accordingly.   
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thread in the origins of the policy central to the global neoliberal turn.  
The revival of market mechanisms was fundamental to the creation of new economic 
orders after World War II and under socialist reforms such as those in China after 1978. Both 
periods of transformation began against a backdrop of comprehensive economic controls. 
Each engendered bitter debates around the question of whether markets require universally 
free prices and the relevance of price controls for the gradual introduction of a constrained 
market mechanism. Neo- liberal and ordoliberal visions of a free market encapsulated in the 
free movement of prices to be achieved by rapid liberalization at all costs competed with more 
pragmatic liberal and socialist outlooks that saw a positive role for price regulation and 
proposed a gradual transition.3  
The postwar transition to a peacetime economy presented economists and social 
theorists with distinct choices about how to construct a market order. Great Britain and West 
Germany came to represent two alternatives: gradual liberalization under an interventionist 
state4 or overnight ordoliberal liberalization to create a social market economy.5 The West 
German postwar economic boom eventually over- shadowed the grave economic difficulties 
and deep social tensions that followed on the heels of the 1948 currency and price reform.  
Ordoliberals were quick to attribute the boom to Ludwig Erhard. The wholesale price 
liberalization that had, in fact, unleashed a general strike and that drove the young German 
Federal Republic into a pro- found political crisis was refashioned as the “Erhard Miracle.” 
Disputes over the nature of the postwar German reforms were invoked in later theoretical 
debates over how to transition from a mixed or planned economy, and their example as an 
apparent success was mobilized in favor of radical price reform by Milton Friedman, among 
others. 
The West German postwar experience was of great relevance to China’s political 
leadership and reform intellectuals after the Cultural Revolution. It was understood as an 
exemplary transition to a new market-economic order. In what follows, I examine the role that 
the so-called Erhard Miracle played in China’s price-reform debate in the  
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first decade of economic system reform, 1978 to 1988. I show that the West German postwar 
reforms were schematically presented as the deed of one man and mystified as a policy that 
generated immediate and automatic economic prosperity. As such, the Erhard Miracle (艾哈 
德奇迹) developed into a powerful metonym for a radical form of price liberalization akin to 
what came to be known as the “big bang” when later imposed on Russia.6 I trace the 
contributions by prominent German ordoliberals such as Wolfram Engels and Armin Gutowski, 
as well as Milton Friedman, during their travels to China, and analyze the subsequent 
instrumentalization of the metaphor of the Erhard Miracle by prominent Chinese free-market 
reformers such as Wu Jinglian.  
The chapter contributes to a growing body of work in global intellectual history that 
studies the dissemination of ideas.7 Rather than conceptualizing China’s reform debates as 
isolated by foregrounding its purported “Chinese characteristics,” this chapter demonstrates 
that the fierce struggle in China over how to carve a path for economic reform has been 
fundamentally linked to international debates regarding market orders. This chapter 
constitutes a first step toward a new historiography of the intellectual foundations of the 
transition out of centrally planned economies: the question of plan and market under state 
socialism is reconnected here with debates over the postwar order and therefore indirectly 
with what is known as the “socialist calculation debate” of the interwar period.  
I draw mainly on German-language scholarship to provide a brief overview of the 
intellectual origins and actual course of the 1948 West German currency and price reforms. 
Against this backdrop, I explore how ordoliberal and neoliberal economists introduced the 
Erhard Miracle into the Chinese reform debate, then turn to how these arguments were 
employed by Chinese economists lobbying for radical price reform in the 1980s. This analysis 
is based on Chinese primary sources and synthesizes insights from an oral history project for  
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which I have interviewed more than fifty Chinese and international economists who 
contributed to China’s reforms.8  
THE “ERHARD MIRACLE”:  
INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS AND POSTWAR REFORMS  
In the midst of World War II, economists around the world had already begun to 
envision a postwar order and to devise methods for a transition to peacetime reconstruction. 
F.A. Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom (1944) was perhaps the most significant and powerful 
statement of this view.9 In this work, Hayek argued that only two mutually exclusive ways of 
organizing economy and society are possible: either central planning or a free society of free 
competition. Not only must central planning necessarily lead to fascism, he argued, but even 
minimal concessions to it would lead society down this dangerous path.10 The debate over the 
postwar order and price liberalization may be considered an extension of the socialist 
calculation debate (SCD). Hayek’s mentor, Ludwig von Mises, had launched the SCD in the 
1920s by claiming that rational socialism is impossible because the price problem is unsolvable 
with- out markets.11 As regards postwar price liberalization, Mises argued along similar lines 
to those of Hayek. He warned that the “middle-of- the-road policy leads to socialism,” as one 
of his titles put it, and that the government control of only a single commodity’s price, such as 
that of milk, would be sufficient to set in train a process of central planning, thereby destroying 
the conditions of free competition.12  
The German ordoliberal agenda of a “social market economy,” as promoted by Ludwig 
Erhard, the Freiburg school, and others at the end of the 1940s, could be mistaken for such a 
“middle-of-the-road policy.” Yet the ordoliberals agreed with neoliberals such as Mises and 
Hayek about the centrality of freely or market-set prices. In terms of plans for practical reform, 
the “real conflict of opinion was between those who felt that the price mechanism must be 




in its applications so as to fulfil social and economic priorities.”13  
Occupation authorities and the emerging West German political parties considered and 
vetted a wide variety of proposals for how to reform the German postwar economy.14 
Ordoliberals, who tended to operate in the American zone, argued in favor of rapid and wide-
ranging price reforms, while Social Democrats, whose stronghold was in the British zone, 
favored a gradual release of price controls and continued direct intervention of the state.15 
Currency reform was to be combined with tax reform and entail the introduction of a new 
currency, while all existing monetary claims and assets would at once be reduced to 10 percent 
of the prereform value. 
The West German currency reform was implemented on June 27, 1948. While the 
reform is often attributed to Erhard, it was essentially the making of the U.S. military 
administration, working in concert with its Western allies.16 By contrast, the decision to 
impose price liberalization beyond currency reform alone was made by the Economic Council 
under Erhard’s directorship. Its aim was to rationalize not only the price level, but also relative 
prices. Erhard announced the liberalization of the majority of prices on the day of the currency 
reform, without the legal approval of the Allied forces or the Länder Council. Only afterward 
did he secure retroactive authorization from General Clay.17  
Ordoliberal and neoliberal economists have promoted a mystified conception of the 
1948 German currency and price reform by attributing it to the singular figure of Erhard himself. 
In a 1977 pamphlet advocating the effectiveness of shock treatment for Britain, Milton 
Friedman saluted the “German Erhard episode in 1948” as a historic breakthrough that 
demonstrated the effectiveness of this policy. Fried- man claimed that Erhard had “terminated 
all wage and price controls over one weekend.”18 In fact, the 1948 German price reform did 
not liberalize all prices, and crucially, it kept control of the prices of essential production and 
consumption goods. Indeed, essential foodstuffs, raw materials, rents, and traffic charges 
continued to be subject to  
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price ceilings for several subsequent decades.19 One scholar estimates that 30 percent of 
consumer-goods prices were regulated by the state in the period from 1948 to 1963.20 
Contradicting Friedman’s recollection of the Erhard reforms, wages were likewise excluded 
from liberalization at the moment price controls were selectively scaled back.21  
In fact, the immediate effect of the Erhard reforms was to provoke social unrest. 
Despite the congruent currency reform, aggregate excess demand caused prices to rise 
rapidly.22 With wages capped and prices rising, workers suddenly faced falling real incomes 
on top of lost savings, as well as a sharp rise in inequality. Unions challenged the foundations 
of the new economic order. On November 12, 1948, West German workers launched a general 
strike, demanding economic planning and renewed price controls.23 The unions’ actions were 
ineffectual in blocking the impending liberalization, yet the economic fate of West Germany 
was left undecided until 1950. Only the outbreak of the Korean War finally induced the boom 
that set the Federal Republic’s economy on a path of export competitiveness and surpluses.24  
In sum, Erhard’s price reform was clearly inspired by the ordo- liberal vision for a social 
market economy, but critically, the prices of scarce and indispensable industrial inputs, as well 
as those of essential consumer goods, were never fully liberalized through Erhard’s efforts. 
Rather, they were controlled at a lower level than what prevailed during the war. This policy, 
in turn, enabled wage repression. Cheap material and labor inputs were the prerequisites for 
the development of the Ger- man export model, and these inputs were based partially—but 
never- theless decisively—on price controls. It was this peculiar feature of the German path to 
liberalization that came to be seen as instructive for those who studied the “Erhard Miracle” 
from abroad.  
 
THE “ERHARD MIRACLE” IN CHINA  
At the height of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong rejected both 
central planning and the market as all-encompassing  
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economic coordinating mechanisms. The rural communes, the ideal of local self-sufficiency, 
and the placement of revolutionary politics ahead of economics instead formed the guiding 
principles for organizing society and the economy.25 Yet the prospect of a new kind of political 
economy was revived in intellectual circles in the years before Mao’s death in 1976. As early 
as three years before Deng Xiaoping’s ascent to power in December 1978—commonly 
understood as the beginning of reform and opening up—a Fudan University research group 
compiled a major publication on the economies of capitalist countries in which the West 
German transition after World War II was subjected to close study.26  
The Fudan research group’s work was not simply an academic account of recent 
economic history, but bore an important, albeit implicit message regarding the group’s view 
of Chinese history. Although the book labeled West Germany a capitalist and imperialist 
country, as was customary at the time, the parallels with China were evident to any attentive 
reader. China had a centrally planned economy within which the chains of command and order 
had collapsed as a result of the Cultural Revolution, just as Germany’s had after World War II. 
As the Cultural Revolution and the explicit rejection of a national economic coordinating 
mechanism came to an end, the question presented itself: How was a new economic order to 
be estab- lished? The challenge faced by China from the mid-1970s onward was confronted 
from a purely economic perspective; at a certain level of abstraction, where the radically 
different political and ideological con- texts could be de-emphasized, China could be seen as 
comparable to postwar West Germany.  
But the West German case was not only of interest to Chinese intel- lectuals and 
political leaders due to the resemblance to the challenges Germany had faced. It was 
particularly worthy of study because of the great economic success of the West German 
economic recovery, the so-called Erhard Miracle. Approximately contemporary with China’s 
revolution and the birth of the New China, Erhard had implemented  
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his reforms, which were said to have enabled his country to rise like a phoenix from the ashes 
of World War II. By comparison, the New China had undergone a series of attempts to push 
ahead to new levels of development, which had succeeded in erasing the worst aspects of 
poverty, but had fallen short of achieving a hoped-for prosperity.  
After a period in which the market was banned as an economic mechanism during the 
Cultural Revolution, reform-minded economists in the second half of the 1970s set out to 
revive Chinese debates from the 1950s and 1960s regarding the use of market mechanisms 
and the law of value.27 Already in 1979, Deng Xiaoping had described to a foreign journalist 
the ways in which China could indeed develop a market economy under socialism.28 In a 
surprising way, the German ordoliberals and intellectual fathers of the concept of a social 
market economy were of interest in this regard. Unlike Hayek or Mises, who rejected the 
compatibility of socialism and the market, Alfred Müller-Armack, who coined the term “social 
market economy,” articulated an instrumentalist argument for how a free-market economy 
could still be considered socialist. In 1946, he wrote “It appears to me to be a mere matter of 
terminology whether one calls a free-market economy socialist or not. The decisive question 
is what order is expected to solve our social problems. If this order is the free-market economy, 
one could no doubt see it as a social, or if you like, a socialist instrument.”29  
As China began opening up to the West in the late 1970s, a notable event was the visit 
of the delegation to West Germany in May 1978, headed by Vice Premier Gu Mu, a veteran of 
the revolution and a leader of economic reform. Gu’s mission was to study what China could 
learn from Germany’s economic development path.30 His report drew much interest among 
Chinese leaders and intellectuals in the economics underlying Erhard’s postwar reforms. The 
Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in 
December 1978 marked both Deng’s ascent to power and the official sanctioning of reform 




development first, instead of revolutionary politics—concerned the rationalization of the price 
system as a condition for the reintroduction of economic incentives while simultaneously 
avoiding inflation. In this regard, Erhard’s reforms were thought to hold important lessons.  
SPREADING THE “ERHARD MIRACLE” IN CHINA: 
VISITS BY GERMAN ORDOLIBERALS AND MILTON FRIEDMAN  
Among the Chinese delegates to West Germany were Vice Pre- mier Fan Yi and Vice 
Foreign Minister Zhang Wenjin. In an effort to learn from Erhard’s postwar reconstruction, 
both approached the West German ambassador to China, Erwin Wickert, and requested he 
arrange for them to meet top experts in German economics.32 Wickert, a member of both the 
Nazi paramilitary wing, the Sturmabteilung (SA), as well as the NSDAP, the Nazi Party itself, had 
previously briefly served in Shanghai for Hitler’s government. Wickert had found his way back 
into the diplomatic service after the war, thanks to the backing of other former high-ranking 
Nazi diplomats.33 Zhang Wenjin and Wickert had both attended school in Berlin at the same 
time. It was there that Zhang first become interested in Marxism; later, he studied under 
Werner Sombart. The two men were friends and openly dis- cussed the question of economic 
reform during Wickert’s tenure in Beijing.34 Wickert promptly delivered on the request for 
experts on the postwar transition and invited Wolfram Engels, a descendant of Fried- rich 
Engels’s brother, to China as his private guest in March 1979.35  
Engels was a prominent German ordoliberal professor of economics. Shortly after his 
visit to China, he founded two research institutes, the Frankfurt Institute (now the Stiftung 
Marktwirtschaft) and the Kronberger Kreis.36 The collaboration of these two institutions was 
vital for preparing the ordoliberal renaissance in Germany after a succession of Social 
Democratic governments.37 At the embassy in China, Wickert hosted a talk by Engels for 
Chinese economists on German reconstruction after World War II. The lecture sparked so  
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much interest from the audience that several other presentations were arranged, and Engels 
was invited for a private dinner with Vice Premier Gu Mu.38 Wickert had initiated the exchange 
with Engels with the support of the Social Democratic chancellor, Helmut Schmidt.39 On the 
occasion of Engels’s exchange with Gu Mu, Wickert reported in a telegram to the chancellery: 
“Gu said...that China had to com- bine the current system with a market economy. The 
question was only how this could be done. The principle that the means of production were 
publicly owned, however, was to be adhered to. He asked himself, if the laws of a market 
economy could work under this condition, to regulate economic activity. Professor Engels 
affirmed this and gave several examples.”40  
Once the decision to reform China’s economy had been reached by the leadership in 
1978, the question of how a market system could be combined with China’s planning system 
dominated the question of whether to use the market at all.41 In this regard, the West German 
reforms could be instructive.  
In his presentations, Engels offered one implicit answer to the question. His key 
message was that the West German Miracle could be replicated in China by implementing 
policies akin to what he saw as Erhard’s reforms: dramatic stabilization policies in the form of 
austerity and monetary control, combined with radical and universal overnight price reform. 
Engels told his Chinese audience that while postwar West Germany was experiencing a period 
of unprecedented prosperity, the real economic miracle had been brief, unforeseen by most, 
and only induced by the 1948 currency and price reform.  
Engels attributed the miracle solely to Erhard. He argued that after the war, the Allied 
powers had continued to administer the planned economy of the Third Reich. Casting the 
ordoliberal reforms as anti- fascist, Engels stressed that putting an end to this system had been 
decisive for West Germany’s subsequent trajectory. The country had lacked a democratic 
government and had faced powerful political forces in favor of the nationalization of all 
industries and planning,  
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making Erhard’s establishment of a free-market economy all the more spectacular. In his 
efforts, the liberalization of prices was an absolute necessity. Suppressing the fact of Erhard’s 
real caution regarding essential consumer goods and production inputs, Engels attributed the 
persistence of limited price controls for essential raw materials such as coal, steel, and iron to 
orders by the military occupation regime. But, Engels argued, despite these constraints, and in 
contrast to the mixture of socialist planning and Keynesianism that dominated in the postwar 
UK and United States, the West German Miracle had helped to spread free-market economics 
globally.42  
Shortly after Engels’s talk, in July 1979, another German ordoliberal economist, Armin 
Gutowski, the director of the Hamburgische Welt-Wirtschafts Archiv (HWWA), an institute of 
international economics, a former member of the German Council of Economic Experts, and a 
founding member of the Kronberger Kreis, and his wife—an editor at Der Spiegel, Renate 
Merklein—were invited to China.43 Gutowski extended the line of argument developed by 
Engels, but was more subtle in adapting his message to the Chinese context and thus was even 
more warmly appreciated by the Chinese reformers. Gutowski was even made an adviser to 
the Chinese government and was perhaps the first Western economist to play this role. He 
returned to China repeatedly and was invited to high-ranking Chinese delegations until his 
early death in 1987.44  
In a 1979 speech published in Chinese in the journal World economy (世界经济), 
Gutowski, like Engels, stressed the critical importance of Erhard’s price and currency reforms 
for the West German economic recovery. He described the immediate postwar German 
economic challenges in terms that must have sounded familiar to the Chinese audience: There 
was severe aggregate excess demand, since production had been aimed at supplying material 
for the war effort, and not consumer goods. With most goods still rationed, money was of 
limited use outside of black markets. China’s socialist planned economy, focused on heavy 
industry, had produced analogous conditions.  
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Gutowski conceded that Germany had experienced high inflation in the immediate 
aftermath of Erhard’s reforms, but he omitted the general strike from his discussion altogether. 
He claimed that the inflationary upswing had precipitated hardly any social disruption, because 
the population was aware at the time that it was only a transitional phenomenon.45 The 
lacunae in Gutowski’s report were diplomatically significant. Social unrest was a top concern 
for Chinese leaders as they contemplated economic reforms.  
During a subsequent visit, Gutowski addressed the question of the compatibility of the 
market with socialism and focused on what China might learn from the German experience.46 
In 1979, he had argued that the success of Erhard’s reforms could be attributed to their estab- 
lishment of an economic order based on the principle of competition. Although some would 
insist that a market economy entails capital- ism, Gutowski argued, German advocates of the 
social market economy had rejected this connection as unnecessary. The public provision of 
social welfare under its program was a case in point.47 In 1981, he elaborated his position 
regarding the market’s relation to socialism. Tactfully, Gutowski sided with Oskar Lange’s 
position in the SCD: “Public ownership can remain unchanged, but there must be competition 
for economic vitality.”48 For the purposes of fostering competition—in addition to suppressing 
inflation—price reform was essential, as Erhard’s success had shown. It could only follow, then, 
that the rationalization of the price system would decide the success or failure of China’s 
reforms.49  
Gutowski’s emphasis on the compatibility of competitive prices with socialism 
resonated with some of China’s most prominent economists of the first generation of 
revolutionaries, such as Xue Muqiao, who had argued since the late 1950s for restoring the 
law of value under Chinese socialism by increasing the use of competitive prices as a reg- 
ulating mechanism.50 Xue and Gutowski were in fact in close contact, and Xue organized some 
of Gutowski’s visits to China, while Gutowski arranged for the German translation of Xue’s 
major contribution to  
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reform thinking.51 In his German preface to Xue’s work, Gutowski stressed that even though 
Xue had begun from a Marxist outlook, he shared many of the author’s conclusions regarding 
China’s reform.52  
A third important ambassador of the Erhard Miracle in China was Milton Friedman.53 
While Engels and Gutowski had both occasionally advanced some arguments concerning the 
origins and consequences of the West German currency and price reform that today do not 
withstand close historical scrutiny, Friedman took the embellishment of Erhard’s Miracle and 
the mythologization of the West German reforms to an even higher level. Before coming to 
China, Friedman had already invoked the West German postwar recovery as vindication of the 
shock treatment of rapid liberalization backed by budget cuts, as in Pinochet’s Chile and the 
crisis in the UK of the late 1970s.54 As part of the Chinese reformers’ policy of “opening the 
minds to the out- side world,” Milton and Rose Friedman were invited to China in 1980. During 
his first visit, Friedman relayed the following anecdote to his audience at the Chinese Academy 
of Social Sciences: “The so-called economic miracle produced by Ludwig Erhard in 1948 was a 
very simple thing. He abolished all price and wage controls and allowed the market to operate 
while at the same time keeping a strict limit on the total quantity of money issued.”55  
Friedman acknowledged some transitional inflation immediately after the 1948 
reforms, but as a monetarist, he argued that a relative increase in the quantity of money was 
the only cause of sustained inflation. As long as the quantity of money was controlled, an 
increase in the price of one commodity must always be compensated by a relative decrease in 
other prices and as such was negligible. Friedman ruled out the validity of cost-push inflation 
theories and did so with reference to Erhard’s reforms.56 Yet Friedman’s claim that Erhard had 
eliminated all price controls was simply false. As we have seen, the prices of essential 
production inputs as well as of basic consumer goods were not liberalized under Erhard, and 
neither had wages been liberalized simultaneously, as Friedman contended. These points are  
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especially important, because a source for cost-push inflation would have originated from 
scarce essential production inputs such as steel and coal, for which demand was inelastic. 
Similarly, the supply of basic consumer goods was limited, and demand was inelastic, as well, 
so if these prices and wages had not been controlled, they could have catalyzed a wage-price 
spiral and sustained inflation.57 As we will see in the next section, the Chinese anticipated the 
danger of cost-push inflation and a wage-price spiral and considered these to be significant 
risks of the mythologized version of Erhard’s radical price reform pro- moted by Friedman.  
Unlike the visits by Engels and Gutowski, which were the starting point for repeated 
exchanges, Friedman’s 1980 tour in China elicited no commitments from the Chinese side. 
Friedman’s discussion of the Erhard reforms was innovative in that it was the first to analyze 
them from a consistent monetarist perspective. In this regard, it was theoretically more 
sophisticated when compared with the anecdotal contributions of Engels and Gutowski. But 
Friedman’s theoretical erudition was advanced at the cost of historical accuracy. It is likely that 
Fried- man’s presentation did not fit with Deng Xiaoping’s new paradigm of “seeking truth from 
facts.”58 Friedman’s portrayal of Erhard may have appeared to his Chinese audience to lack 
sufficient realism.  
The Chinese price system had been basically frozen over the course of the Cultural 
Revolution from 1966 to 1976. In the first years of reform, the price system was adjusted by 
central command, and the market, as the new regulating mechanism, was introduced at the 
mar- gins of the system. But a wide-ranging or even universal one-stroke overnight 
liberalization emulating the mythologized Erhard price reform was not implemented, even 
though some reform leaders and economists, as well as some World Bank and other foreign 
advisers, thought that this was the best—indeed, necessary—path for China. Economists such 
as Wu Jinglian repeatedly invoked the Erhard Mir- acle metaphor to argue for radical price 
reform. At the famous 1985 Bashanlun conference co-organized by the World Bank, the former  
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director of the Bundesbank (1976 to 1979), Otmar Emminger, who had helped shape the 
German monetary policy since 1950, once more advised China to pursue a so-called “big bang,” 
justifying his policy recommendation with reference to the Erhard Miracle.59 China came close 
to pursuing shock therapy in 1986 and again in 1988, but ultimately averted this radical policy 
choice.60  
CONCLUSION  
From the late 1970s on, three distinct dimensions of the so-called Erhard reforms 
aroused interest among Chinese intellectuals and reform leaders. Each motivated intense 
exchanges with ordoliberal and neoliberal economists about the nature of price reform. First, 
the apparently unexpected economic success of West Germany after the destruction of World 
War II seemed to the Chinese to be the break- through that the Great Leap Forward and Big 
Push Industrialization had intended, but failed to deliver. This misleading representation of 
spontaneous West German recovery cannot withstand critical scrutiny today, because it is by 
no means settled whether the cause of success was the leap in the dark or the preexisting 
industrial foun- dations, combined with foreign assistance.61 Nevertheless, Germany’s 
economic boom resonated with the Chinese who were attempting to jump-start rapid 
economic development at the dawn of the reform era.  
The second dimension of the Erhard reforms of special interest to the Chinese was the 
evident similarity of the two cases in the implementation of price controls. From a technical 
point of view, the post- war German problem was similar to that of the beginning of Chinese 
reforms. In both cases, chains of command and order within a centrally planned command 
economy had collapsed, even if for radically different reasons and in drastically different 
contexts. Nevertheless, in both cases, the question arose of how to create a new economic 
order that could allow for a greater role for market mechanisms. Since market competition 
required some degree of price flexibility,  
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price flexibility quickly became a focus: How was it to be achieved, and to what degree was 
liberalization necessary? In this regard, the radical West German 1948 price reform was a 
relevant experience for China.  
Third, despite the vastly different ideological contexts of postwar Germany and post–
Cultural Revolution China, the ordoliberal vision of a social market economy spoke to China’s 
debate over the compatibility between socialism and the market. The ordoliberals had insisted, 
rightly or wrongly, that the existence of a market economy did not necessarily entail full-
fledged capitalism. As Keith Tribe has observed with regard to the Freiburg school, the 
ordoliberals had a “conception of economic organization that represents a genuine effort to 
move beyond the sterile contraposition of market to plan and vice versa.”62 Those ordoliberals 
who visited China in the 1980s knew how to adapt their vision to the Chinese context by way 
of economic diplomacy.  
This chapter has demonstrated that the German ordoliberals Wolfram Engels and 
Armin Gutowski, as well as Chicago school economist Milton Friedman, introduced the concept 
of the so-called Erhard Miracle to China. At the beginning of their efforts, neoliberal overtures 
mainly took the form of a sugarcoated case study of the postwar West German reforms. 
Neoliberal advice was solicited by Chinese leaders and economists who thought the German 
experience held lessons for China, but the West German case was increasingly transformed 
into a metaphor for the ostensible success of a drastic price liberalization known as the Erhard 
Miracle. The Erhard Miracle came to play an important role in China’s fierce reform debate, 
mobilized as anecdotal evidence for an essentially magical solution to a complex problem. Over 
the course of this process, historical details, especially regarding the critical question of the 
range of the price reform and the continuity in controls of essential consumption goods and 
industrial inputs, were increasingly disregarded. The Erhard Miracle came to stand for the 
wonders of overnight and all-encompassing price reform  
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as invoked by Friedman. Such a radical, one-stroke reform was repeat- edly prepared, but 
never implemented in China. From the mid-1980s onward, however, the group of economists 
who campaigned for radical price liberalization gave the Erhard Miracle a prominent place in 
their narrative.  
As I describe elsewhere, adulation of the Erhard Miracle was once again part of the 
economic discussion in China in 1988, after an aborted attempt at far-ranging price reforms, 
when Friedman made his second visit to the country in the hope of assisting the Chinese in 
their final push toward a “big bang,” one component of the “shock therapy” administered to 
Eastern Europe and Russia.63 The ordoliberals who contributed to China’s search for a market 
reform approach were not all united in their mystification of the postwar West German 
experience, however. Wilhelm (Willy) Linder and Hans-Karl Schneider, who had both done 
extensive research on industrial prices such as energy, approached the question of what China 
could learn from the West German experience not from the angle of the overall eco- nomic 
order, but from the feasibility of liberalizing specific prices. They warned that essential 
industrial prices could not be abandoned without risking runaway inflation. Even the leader of 
the Mont Pelerin Society, Herbert Giersch, cautioned that the institutional reality in China had 
to be considered carefully before taking a sudden step toward wholesale liberalization.64 The 
warnings of prominent ordo- liberals resonated with the group of Chinese economists who 
sought to defend China’s experimentalist, gradual reform against shock therapy. Both the 
proponents of shock therapy and the opponents of this approach to “big bang” marketization 
based themselves on the West German model. The underlying and competing interpretations 
of Erhard’s reforms of the immediate postwar period thus returned in China’s internal debates 
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